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Actions can be moral or immoral, surely, but can also be prudent or imprudent,
rude or polite, sportsmanlike or unsportsmanlike, and so on. The fact that diverse
methods of evaluating action exist seems to give rise to a further question: what
distinguishes moral evaluation in particular? In this article, my concern is method-
ological. I argue that any account of the distinctiveness of morality cannot be prior
to substantive inquiry into the content of moral reasons, requirements, and con-
cerns. The genuine distinctiveness of morality will become clear only after we have
determined what those very reasons, requirements, and concerns really are.
However important moral standards may be, surely we can all agree that
they aren’t the only ways to evaluate action. Actions can be moral or
immoral, surely, but can also be prudent or imprudent, honorable or
dishonorable, rude or polite, sportsmanlike or unsportsmanlike, and so
on. Some of these evaluations are related, somemay imply others. But the
fact that diverse methods of evaluating action exist seems to give rise to a
further question: what distinguishes moral evaluation in particular? This
question has a long history, and its persistence is easy to understand.1 To
account for the distinctiveness of morality has long been thought crucial
to the conduct of moral inquiry. Without first understanding what dis-
tinguishes morality in particular, we have the potential to end up with a
moral theory that confuses specifically moral norms with those of distinct
domains.
In this article, I will not present a theory of morality’s distinguishing
characteristics ðthough, in conclusion, I will briefly suggest what the best
accountwill look likeÞ. Rather,my concern ismethodological. Virtually all
1. For a brief, and certainly not comprehensive, survey of the literature, see G. J.
Warnock, Contemporary Moral Philosophy ðLondon: Macmillan, 1967Þ; Kurt Baier, The Moral
Point of View ðIthaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1958Þ; Bernard Gert, Morality ðOxford:
Oxford University Press, 2005Þ; Brad Hooker, “The Definition of Morality” ðunpublished
manuscript, University of ReadingÞ; Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings ðCambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1990Þ, 47.
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who attempt to account for the distinctiveness ofmoral standards do so in
a way that is prior to substantive moral inquiry. The distinctiveness of
morality is presented not as a result of an investigation into the content of
the moral point of view, but rather as ðimplicitly, if not explicitlyÞ a way to
independently shape or constrain such inquiry. Call the project of fixing
the distinctiveness of morality prior to substantivemoral investigation The
Project. In this article, I argue that The Project cannot succeed. Though
morality is surely distinct from other domains, morality’s distinctiveness
cannot be settled prior to substantive inquiry into the content of moral
reasons, requirements, andconcerns. Rather, the genuinedistinctiveness of
morality will become clear only after we have determined what those re-
quirements, reasons, and concerns really are.
My argument proceeds in the following way. In the first section, I
introduce The Project in more detail, the tests any potential distin-
guishing mark of morality must pass to be successful on The Project’s
terms, and the surprising reach of The Project in contemporary moral
theorizing. Beginning in the second section, I discuss five potential ac-
counts of morality’s distinctiveness, none of which ðI argueÞ can satisfy
The Project; I argue that the failure of these accounts is good evidence,
not dispositive of course, that The Project should be abandoned. In
Section V, I conclude by drawing a number of lessons for future moral
inquiry in light of The Project’s demise.
I. THE PROJECT, ITS REQUIREMENTS, AND ITS REACH
Consider the notion of a domain or standard or standpoint ðI’ll use these
terms interchangeablyÞ. As I understand these ideas, a domain or stand-
point can be defined in functional terms: domains issue evaluative ver-
dicts ðof varying kindsÞ about particular targets by taking, as inputs, par-
ticular facts about these targets.2 Morality is a domain in this sense; so is
aesthetics, etiquette, sportsmanship, and so on.With all this inmind, The
Project is an effort to distinguish themoral domain—that is, determine a
particular property or set of properties that applies to morality in par-
ticular—prior to substantive first-order investigation into the content of
moral requirements, reasons, and so forth; prior, that is, to determining
the right theory of the moral domain. Put in this way, The Project may
seem a pretty niche enterprise. Why conduct it?
The most important answer to this question, at least according to
many, is that morality’s distinguishing marks play an important role in
setting the terms of moral inquiry. To see this, consider the following
passage by Warnock: “When philosophers discuss moral principles, what
2. More on this in Dale Dorsey, The Limits of Moral Authority ðOxford: OxfordUniversity
Press, 2016Þ, chap. 1.
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are they discussing? What does ‘moral’ mean? What distinguishes a moral
view from views of other kinds? I think itmust be quite clear that there is no
easy answer to these questions; and yet, until they are answered, it seems
thatmoral philosophers cannot really knowwhat they are talking about, or
at any rate, perhapsno less importantly, cannot be sure whether or not they
are all talking about the same thing.”3 Brad Hooker says something simi-
lar: “When trying to decide which rival moral theory seems best to us,
we should ascertain, among other things, how well these theories cohere
with our most confident moral convictions about moral principles and
about more or less specific kinds of cases. To run that test on moral theo-
ries, however, we need to be able to distinguish ourmoral convictions from
other kinds of conviction.”4 The thoughts of Hooker and Warnock can
be glossed in the following way. In attempting to determine the correct
moral theory, we test substantive theories and particular verdicts against
our considered moral judgments. But we don’t test moral theories against
judgments that lack moral content ðfor instance, a judgment that one
ought to wear one’s cummerbund with the pleats up-facingÞ. Hence we
must know what distinguishes a considered judgment that someone ought
to f with moral content from one without moral content. Otherwise we
would get a distortedmoral theory, one that is not genuinelymoral. Notice
that for both Warnock and Hooker, one cannot even begin the project
of moral inquiry unless and until one knows morality’s distinguishing
marks. For Warnock and Hooker, these distinguishing marks form a kind
of “gatekeeper”: for any X ðrequirement, reason, etc.Þ to be a genuinely
moral X—and for the judgment that X is a reason, requirement, and so
on, to have genuinely moral content—it must be compatible with the dis-
tinguishing property of the moral domain. Thus we arrive at The Project:
an attempt to determine the distinguishing property or properties of the
moral domain prior to, and in a way that would set the boundaries of, sub-
stantivemoral investigation.
What would a successful, Project-satisfying mark of the moral look
like? Quite generally, when it comes to the distinctiveness of morality, we
are looking for a particular property ðor collection of propertiesÞ that
holds ofmorality and no other domains—that is, that distinguishes it. But
it must, plausibly, do more than this. First, any account of the distinc-
tiveness of morality, besides homing in on a property that is genuinely
unique of the moral domain, must pick out a property that is sufficiently
robust. I won’t give a precise theory of what it means for a property to be
robust in this sense. I’m not going to commit to the claim, for instance,
that morality’s distinguishing marks must be necessary or essential. ðThe
project of distinguishing morality is, at least as I understand it here, the
3. Warnock, Contemporary Moral Philosophy, 52.
4. Hooker, “The Definition of Morality,” 1.
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project of figuring out how to distinguish morality from other domains
in this world, not across possible worlds.Þ However, it should be the case
that the distinguishing properties aren’t entirely accidental; the relevant
property should continue to track morality assuming relatively trivial
changes or counterfactuals. For instance, it would certainly be unac-
ceptable to distinguishmorality from other domains by noting the, surely
correct, claim that morality is the domain that is most often argued about
by those who have written PhD dissertations on moral philosophy—it
would be wrong to say that the requirement to eat salad with the left-
most fork is now a rule of morality just on the grounds of some peculiar
sociological shift. I take it that the requirement of robustness should be
relatively intuitive, even if the concept, along the margins, isn’t precisely
theorized.
Now, to merely distinguish morality it would be sufficient, say, to
figure out what particular theory of moral reasons, requirements, and
concerns is true, and identify that as morality’s mark. But, quite obviously,
this would not be to satisfy The Project; to satisfy The Project, the dis-
tinctive features of morality must be determinable prior to the conduct of
substantive inquiry into the nature of moral reasons, requirements, and
so forth ð“first-order” moral inquiryÞ. If the distinctiveness of morality has
to await the results of first-order inquiry, it would be impotent to deter-
mine what is admissible in such an inquiry, that is, to keep the gate.
What sort of epistemic status must a distinguishing property have
to be prior to substantive inquiry? One possible answer is that it must be
nonnegotiable, that is, unrevisable on the basis of subsequent investiga-
tion. This seems plausible: after all, if we hold that a particular distin-
guishing property p could be revised on the basis of first-order investiga-
tion, it would be hard to say that we have established p truly distinguishes
the moral domain from all others prior to conducting that investigation.
Furthermore, it seems hard to fathom, if The Project is motivated—a lá
Warnock and Hooker—by the need for a gatekeeper, that first-order in-
vestigation could influence whether we accept Project-satisfying distin-
guishingproperties. For thedistinguishingproperty tobe the right kindof
gatekeeper is for that property to, at least in part, determine what sorts of
judgments ðsuch as “r is a moral reason to f,” “it is plausible to say that A
must w in circumstances c,” and so onÞ count as relevant to first-order
moral inquiry and which are irrelevant. But if this is correct, any potential
judgment that is inconsistent with the gatekeeping property will already
have been declared nonmoral in content, or otherwise irrelevant to sub-
stantive inquiry. And so we had better be confident that morality’s dis-
tinguishing properties are fixed independently of substantive first-order
inquiry that is conducted only in light of morality’s special distinctiveness.
Of course, one might reasonably question this. Must we really say
that the distinguishing features of the moral domain are absolutely un-
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revisable on the basis of subsequent investigation?5 For the sake of argu-
ment, assume not. However, even if one needn’t commit to the claim that
these distinguishing properties will hold come what may, that morality’s
distinctiveness is prior to substantive inquiry, and determines what is and
isn’t admissible in first-order moral theorizing, seems to entail that con-
fidence in them should be quite high. Howhigh? It’s hard to state precisely,
but the following seems to me a sensible test: to say that an account of
the distinctiveness of morality—what distinguishes morality and moral
inquiry in particular—is prior to substantivemoral inquiry is at least to say
that this account can plausibly declare particular propositions, judg-
ments, and so forth as relevant or irrelevant to first-order investigation.
In other words, it is at least to say that this account of morality’s distinc-
tiveness can serve the gatekeeping role that motivates The Project in the
first place. If, for instance, it is not plausible to rule out of moral con-
sideration a proposition r that conflicts with a purported distinguishing
property p, then we couldn’t possibly have established that p character-
izes the distinctiveness of the moral domain prior to a determination of
the substantive merits of p versus r. And though this leaves open the
possibility that we may be mistaken about whether p holds of or properly
distinguishes morality,6 it shows that we must be very confident indeed
in any Project-satisfying distinguisher.
Given the epistemic demands of The Project, one might wonder
who, in fact, takes it up.7 But The Project is more widespread than it may
seem: virtually all who discuss the distinctiveness of morality offer their
view not only as prior to substantive inquiry, but as fulfilling the gate-
keeping role that necessitates The Project. For instance, Shafer-Landau
and Cuneo hold that what distinguishes morality from other domains is
the presence of a list of propositions identified as “moral fixed points.”8
However, for Shafer-Landau and Cuneo, these propositions are quite
clearly intended to satisfy The Project: any “consistent body of moral
propositions that apply to beings like us in a world such as ours” must
display these “fixed points.“9 Futhermore, they insist that these proposi-
tions have the strong epistemic status required by The Project: we would
5. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing this point quite helpfully.
6. For instance, we may conduct first-order inquiry treating p as a gatekeeper, but
find that when all is said and done, this theory is terribly unattractive; we might then revisit
p qua distinguishing property.
7. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer. While I think virtually all who discuss the distinc-
tiveness of morality take up The Project ðincluding those mentioned in the next two para-
graphsÞ, not all do. Bernard Williams’s discussion of morality’s distinctiveness ðin Morality
½Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1972, 73–78Þ seems tome an important exception.
8. Russ Shafer-Landau and Terence Cuneo, “The Moral Fixed Points: New Directions
for Moral Nonnaturalism,” Philosophical Studies 171 ð2014Þ: 399–443, 405–6.
9. Ibid., 404.
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revise them only if our strongest considered judgments were illusory.10
In addition, Mackie insists that “a morality” ðin the narrow sense, see
belowÞ is a domain “whose central task is to protect the interests of per-
sons other than the agent.” For Mackie, this determines what counts as a
genuinely moral consideration.11 Gibbard says something similar, but
with a different distinguishing mark: “all norms, in a sense, are norms of
rationality but moral norms in particular are norms for the rationality of
guilt and resentment.”12 For Gibbard, this determines just what sorts
of judgments have moral content: “to think an act morally reprehensible
is to accept norms that prescribe, for such a situation, guilt on the part of
the agent and resentment on the part of others.”13 For Philippa Foot,
what counts as “evidence in morals” ðread: what is admissible in first-
order moral inquiry—what passes the gateÞmust be determined by some
general reference to morality’s distinctive concern with well-being and
cognate concepts ðsuch as harmÞ.14 Somewhat more recently, Nicholas
Southwood has insisted that morality has a distinctive ground ði.e., it is
grounded independent of social practiceÞ.15 For Southwood, as for the
others discussed and cited here,morality’s distinctive ground determines
what sorts of judgments have moral content—for a normative judgment
to be grounded in some other way is dispositive evidence that such a
judgment fails to have a place in a genuinely moral investigation.16
In addition, The Project operates as a sort of “shadow thesis,” as it
were, standing behind a number of influential arguments in normative
ethics. Indeed, many have marshalled the gatekeeping function of mo-
rality’s distinguishing marks in an attempt to reject various first-order
moral theories. Consequentialism has been a prime target of such ar-
guments. Stephen Darwall is chief among those who make this move.
According to Darwall, there is a distinctive connection between morality
and the notion of “accountability” and the reactive attitudes—this is
10. Ibid., 415.
11. J. L. Mackie, Morality: Inventing Right and Wrong ðNew York: Penguin, 1977Þ, 106.
Thosewho followMackie here includeT.M. Scanlon,WhatWeOwe to EachOther ðCambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1998Þ, 6–7.
12. Gibbard,Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, 47. Thosewho shareGibbard’s view include John
Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, V.14; Douglas Portmore, Commonsense Consequentialism ðOxford:
Oxford University Press, 2011Þ, 43–44; Stephen Darwall, “Morality’s Distinctiveness,” in
Morality, Authority, and Law ðOxford: Oxford University Press, 2013Þ; Hooker, “The Defi-
nition of Morality”; and many others.
13. Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, 47. The first emphasis mine, the second his.
14. Philippa Foot, “Moral Arguments,” in Virtue and Vices ðOxford: Oxford University
Press, 1977Þ, 96–109, 105–6. Warnock’s view is similar. See Warnock, Contemporary Moral
Philosophy, 57.
15. Nicholas Southwood, “The Moral/Conventional Distinction,” Mind 120 ð2011Þ:
761–802.
16. See ibid., 761–64.
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what renders morality distinct from, for example, etiquette and other
domains.17On this basis, Darwall claims that utilitarianmoral theories are
false, not as a result of a substantive first-order inquiry into their merits or
demerits, but rather because they generate “reasons of the wrong kind to
justify moral obligation” in light of morality’s distinctive connection to
blame and accountability.18 In a way very similar to Darwall, Douglas
Portmore argues, explicitly on the basis of an account of morality’s dis-
tinctiveness, that classical forms of utilitarianism are incorrect.19 Port-
more holds that morality’s distinctive normative authority is itself a gate-
keeping constraint on moral theorizing.20 Bernard Gert also marshals
the “definition” of morality to reject consequentialism.21 Of course, con-
sequentialism is not the only target of arguments of this kind. Famously,
John Stuart Mill refers to his own account of morality’s distinctiveness to
rule out a number of potential notions of justice as playing a role in
understanding that concept’s moral purport.22 Furthermore, Scanlon
argues, on the basis of an account of morality’s narrow sense ðthe sense
relevant here, see belowÞ, that moral theories that include prohibitions
against certain formsof consensual sex are simply ruledout.23 And soon.24
Thus as a sociological matter, The Project is well entrenched. And, I
think, it’s easy to see why. After all, why should we be interested in what’s
distinctive of morality, rather than the more pedestrian question of what’s
true of morality? Why be concerned with morality’s peculiar ground,
source, content, relations with other normative concepts, rather than with
figuring out, by whatever inquiry is necessary, what morality’s ground,
source, content, and so forth, is? The natural answer is that in coming
to understand what distinguishes the moral domain from other sorts of
domains, we better understand how to sort judgments, reasons, require-
17. Stephen Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint ðCambridge, MA: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 2006Þ, 91–95. For Darwall, there is a “conceptual connection between imputing
wrong and blame“ ð94Þ, and that his argument against consequentialism rests on the
supposition that “responsibility and ½moral obligation are conceptually tied in the ways we
have noted” ð103Þ.
18. Ibid., 91.
19. Portmore, Commonsense Consequentialism, 29.
20. See, especially, ibid., 29, 43–44.
21. See Gert, Morality, 6. and 149–51.
22. Mill, Utilitarianism, V.14.
23. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other , 172.
24. A note: to rule out particular competitor moral theories in this way it is not strictly
speaking required to fully distinguish morality from other domains—it is required only to
pick out an essential property that holds independently of substantive moral inquiry and
note that the particular theory isn’t compatible with that property, whether or not any other
domain also maintains that property. However, for present purposes this fact is moot; the
argumentative maneuvers on offer here make reference specifically to features that are
intended not just to be robust features of morality, but features that are particular to
morality.
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ments, and so on into those that are genuinely relevant for the business of
figuring out the truth about morality, in particular. And while not all will
agree with Hooker and Warnock that without such gatekeepers moral
inquiry is doomed, it is clear that the use of the distinctiveness of morality
as a gatekeeper—which motivates The Project—plausibly explains the
interest in morality’s distinctive features, over and above the question of
morality’s features.
Two notes should be made here prior to my substantive examina-
tion of The Project. First, the term “morality” plausibly comes in two
senses, as distinguished here by Mackie: “A morality in the broad sense
would be a general, all-inclusive theory of conduct: the morality to which
someone subscribed would be whatever body of principles he allowed
ultimately to guide or determine his choices of action. In the narrow
sense, a morality is a system of a particular sort of constraints on con-
duct—one whose central task is to protect the interests of persons other
than the agent and which present themselves to an agent as checks on
his natural inclinations or spontaneous tendencies to act.”25 Insofar as
The Project seeks to identify the fundamental distinguishing condi-
tions of morality, etiquette, and so forth, The Project seeks to distinguish
morality in its narrow sense. Of course, it could be an important result
that there is no genuine distinction betweenmorality’s narrow and broad
senses. Indeed, someone could seek to distinguish morality’s narrow
sense by identifying it withmorality’s broad sense. ðMore on this proposal
in Sec. IV.Þ However, The Project as I’m understanding it here seeks to
distinguish morality’s narrow sense rather than its broad sense. Because
morality’s broad sense is “all-inclusive,” inquiry into morality in this sense
need not be constrained or limited by an understanding of morality, gen-
erally. Because it is an all-inclusive guide to conduct, all judgments are
relevant.
Second, and building on the first, it is possible that The Project is
simply fundamentally misguided, for the following reason: just as there
is a distinction between broad and narrow senses of the term “morality,”
there may also be further senses of morality, namely, those picked out by
different potential distinguishing characteristics.26 So, for instance, Mill
and Gibbard may use the term “morality” simply to pick out the norms
relevant to praise and blame; Foot may use the term to refer to norms
relevant to well-being and cognate concepts; Mackie may use it to pick
out norms that are generally other-regarding, and so on. This would
entail, of course, that these philosophers are simply talking past each
other, and hence there may be no substantive issue when it comes to the
distinguishing mark of morality. However, this interpretation of the di-
25. Mackie, Morality, 106.
26. Thanks to Roger Crisp for suggesting this possibility.
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alectic should be treated as a last resort. First, I’m willing to allow prac-
titioners of The Project the assumption that there is a genuine issue
to be discussed here, namely, the delineation of a particular action-
evaluative domain called “morality,” which differs ðat least conceptuallyÞ
from etiquette, prudence, norms of sportsmanship, and so on. The ques-
tion, then, is why and how it so differs; what distinguishes the moral
domain from others. We may, of course, discover that we’ve been using
this term in different senses all along; but I suggest we conclude this only
after exhausting the possibilities ðincluding possibilities I suggest in the
last section of this articleÞ for coming to agreement concerning the dis-
tinguishing features of the moral domain. And second, to insist that the
distinguishing characteristics of morality are merely stipulative threat-
ens to strip arguments against particular moral theories that rely on
The Project of all force. It would not do, for instance, to argue against
utilitarianism by suggesting that utilitarianism provides “reasons of the
wrong kind,” on the basis of a stipulative account of morality’s distin-
guishing characteristics.27
My examination of The Project’s prospects will proceed by investi-
gating the most significant accounts of morality’s distinctiveness. Of
course, I won’t be able to investigate them all, as the number of potential
proposals is far too large. But there are five that I believe are worthy of
special treatment. If none of these succeed in vindicating The Project,
this is good evidence, not proof of course, that The Project is in real
trouble. These accounts are:
1. The Content View : morality has a distinctive set of concerns, re-
quirements, and reasons for action.
2. The Grounds View : morality maintains a distinctive ground or
source.
3. The Reactive Attitudes View ðRAViewÞ: morality is such that failure
to conform to its demands yields appropriate guilt and makes
one the appropriate target of reactive attitudes.
4. The Motivational View : morality has a special connection to the
motivational states of rational agents.
5. The Normativity View : morality has distinctive normative force;
that is, one is normatively required to conform to moral require-
ments to a greater extent than requirements of other domains.
27. Note that Darwall, at one point, suggests that his conceptual connection between
moral obligation on the one hand and accountability on the other could just be stipu-
lated. See Darwall, The Second Person Standpoint, 95. But it’s clear that, for Darwall, he be-
lieves that his account of the distinctiveness of morality isn’t just stipulative: it tracks the
common concept of morality, or at least the concept of morality shared by the moral the-
orists with whom he’s engaging. Indeed, this is explicit in Darwall, The Second Person Stand-
point, 95. See also Darwall, “Morality’s Distinctiveness.”
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In the next section, I discuss the the Content View, followed by the
Grounds View in Section III. In Section IV, I discuss the RA View, Mo-
tivational View, and Normativity View together.
II. A DECENT PLACE TO START: CONTENT
Let’s start with morality’s content. To distinguish the moral domain by
reference to its content smacks of rugged good sense. After all, what dis-
tinguishes morality and, say, prudence? Surely the facts that each domain
takes as relevant ðas an “input“Þ in evaluation ðwhat these domains “care
about”Þ: morality cares about people other than the agent; prudence cares
only about the agent’s interests.What distinguishesmorality and etiquette?
Again, what these domains care about: morality cares, for instance, about
the quality of peoples’ lives, etiquette is concerned with social niceties, and
so on. Indeed, there are many potential accounts of morality’s distinctive
content. As Mackie does in the passage cited above, one could distinguish
morality by the claim that it is other-regarding: its obligations refer spe-
cifically to those other than the agent herself. Alternatively, one could
identify a set of moral reasons or concerns that must be respected for any
potential moral theory to count as admissible. Other proposals, as well as
various hybrids, are certainly possible.
Reference to morality’s content qua distinguisher seems like a good
place to start for two reasons. First, it seems relatively trivial that morality
has a distinctive content. Surely no other domain cares about exactly the
same things, and to exactly the same degree, issuing exactly the same
evaluations, as morality ðor so I shall assume for the sake of argument
hereÞ. And, second, morality’s content is strongly robust. Notice that we
often “take up” standpoints: we evaluate such-and-such an action from
a particular domain, we guide our decisions by taking up a particular
standpoint, and so forth. Commonsensically, to take up a standpoint like
morality, say, is simply to allow one’s deliberation or evaluation to be
guided by certain characteristic concerns rather than others; to see par-
ticular facts about an action as relevant and as possessing a certain va-
lence, and to leave aside other facts that don’t matter to this particular
mode of evaluation. Thus, or so it would appear, it is sufficient to take up
morality rather than some other domain for one to deliberate or evaluate
given a distinctive content, set of concerns or reasons, and to generate
particular evaluations or demands on the basis of that content, those rea-
sons, concerns, and so on. Thus morality’s content is not a mere acci-
dental property but is instead robust in just the way a distinguishing char-
acteristic ought to be.
However, or so I shall claim, there are good reasons to believe that
a content-based view cannot satisfy The Project. The key is the special
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epistemic status required by a Project-satisfying distinguisher. Note that
for a particular content-based property to be prior to substantive moral
inquiry, this property must be sufficiently “coarse-grained.” To see what I
mean by this, note that if a candidate content-based property p were
incompatible with a number of plausibly recognized moral theories, it
would hardly be plausible to say that we know p holds prior to investi-
gation of the substantive merits of p. It would certainly be implausible,
in other words, to say that any inconsistent judgments or propositions
should be just ruled out of substantive moral investigation. But, second,
for p to be genuinely distinctive, p must be sufficiently “fine-grained”:
it must close off sufficient normative concerns to plausibly distinguish
morality from other domains that may share such concerns. But these
criteria are obviously in tension. The more fine-grained, and hence the
more plausible it becomes to say that p is a genuine distinguishing cri-
terion, the more implausible it is to say that that p can maintain the strong
epistemic status required for p to be a Project-satisfying distinguisher. Call
this the “coarse/fine tension.”
To see this problem in more detail, consider a proto-version of
Mackie’s view, namely, that morality in the narrow sense is distinguished
by its other-regardingness. ðMackie’s actual view is more complex, see
n. 28; we might call a pure other-regardingness proposal the “sub-Mackien
view.”Þ This criterion is not sufficiently fine-grained. Take etiquette. I
cannot act rudely if there is no one to whom my rudeness is directed, or
who takes my behavior as offensive, or who would take my behavior as
offensive under standard conditions, and so forth. Indeed, not only are
there many other-regarding domains, the number seems virtually unlim-
ited. Take feudal norms. These norms indicate how the members of di-
vergent social classes ought to treat each other; given that they govern
behavior in interaction between social classes, however, they are neces-
sarily other-regarding ðno one is in a different social class than herselfÞ.
Take also norms of sportsmanship. Sportsmanship norms are concerned
specifically with the proper treatment of one’s opponent in the context of
games or matches. ðYou cannot be a poor sport in a purely self-regarding
way.ÞAndhence sportsmanshipwouldappear tobeother-regarding in the
sense under consideration.
This shows that the sub-Mackien view is not sufficiently fine-grained: it
does not zero in specifically on morality rather than on a family of other-
regarding ðbut independentÞ domains. As far as The Project is concerned,
to use mere other-regardingness as a gatekeeper risks letting in too much:
confusing our moral inquiry with inquiry into, say, feudal norms, and so
on. Thus one has to supplement the claim thatmorality is other-regarding
with additional content-based properties to render it specific enough to
plausibly serve as a distinguishing mark of the moral. In particular, one
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might say that morality ðand not feudal norms, etc.Þ is concerned with
others’ well-being in a way that feudal norms aren’t.28 Etiquette also seems
unconcerned with well-being. As a polite person, my behavior is not de-
termined by what would make other people’s lives better. Instead, it is
guided by traditional social norms—“what’s done”—and the like.
But to supplement an other-regarding approach in this way, while it
is specific enough to rule out etiquette, runs into the contrary problem.
By becoming sufficiently fine-grained, it is now too fine-grained: it is not
coarse-grained enough to be adequately prior to substantive inquiry, to
serve as a gatekeeper. Take the following case:
Johnny : Johnny’s uncle Stan recently died. While he was dying,
however, Stan asked Johnny to give a piece of old costume jewelry
he has been keeping for years to a long-lost schoolyard sweetheart.
After his uncle dies, however, Johnny decides to pawn the jewelry
for $10 for the purposes of gambling in a local casino.
I’munsure ofwhether Johnnyhas done anythingmorally wronghere. But
it certainly doesn’t seem ruled out to say that the fact that Johnny didn’t
conform to his uncle’s wishes is itself good reason for thinking that his
action is something that morality evaluates negatively ðindependently,
say, of facts about Johnny’s, Stan’s, or Stan’s sweetheart’s welfare or in-
terestsÞ. Of course, there’s a reply to be made here. It could very well be
that a well-being-based account of morality might allow a blanket rule
against, say, ignoring the wishes of the dead, perhaps for so trivial a
cause.29 Various forms of rule-utilitarianism or -consequentialism seem
suited to that task. But, and here’s the crucial question, is it plausible to
suggest that the only justification for a rule against Johnny’s behavior
that is allowed a substantive hearing is one that adverts to welfarist con-
siderations? Surely not. Thus whether morality is strictly concerned with
others’ well-being seems not to be prior to substantive investigation. Thus
“other-regardingness” can’t work as a Project-satisfying distinguisher: it
runs into the tension between the coarse-grainedness required to satisfy
TheProject and thefine-grainedness required tobegenuinely distinctive.
Here’s another way to bring out this tension. Shafer-Landau and
Cuneo identify a set of “moral fixed points”: propositions that serve to
delineate the moral domain, which could, in principle, serve to satisfy
The Project: no incompatible judgments are admissible in a purely moral
28. This seems to be something more like Mackie’s actual view, as stated in the pre-
vious quotation. See also Foot, “Moral Arguments”; Williams, Morality, 73–81; Warnock,
Contemporary Moral Philosophy, 57.
29. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer.
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inquiry ðfor the sake of brevity I’ll quote only a few here, as that is suffi-
cient to give you the flavorÞ:
• It is pro tanto wrong to engage in the recreational slaughter of a
fellow person.
• It is pro tanto wrong to break a promise on which another is
relying simply for convenience’s sake.
• It is pro tanto wrong to humiliate others simply for pleasure.
• It is pro tanto wrong to torture others just because they have
inconvenienced you.
• It is pro tanto wrong to impose severe burdens on others simply
because of their physical appearance.…30
The coarse/fine tension once again arises. Question: how do we inter-
pret the claim that it is “pro tanto wrong to humiliate others simply for
pleasure”? Three possibilities suggest themselves. The first insists that to
say that it is “pro tanto wrong to humiliate others simply for pleasure” just
is to say that the fact that f-ing humiliates others simply for pleasure is itself
a moral reason against f-ing. But this interpretation renders the claims
in question too fine-grained. For instance, imagine a moral view accord-
ing to which all moral reasons against action should advert to consider-
ations about well-being and/or harm in particular. Call this “the harm
view.” I submit that the harm view should not be ruled out of first-order
moral inquiry without a substantive hearing. But the current interpre-
tation of the relevant “fixed point” does: on this interpretation, the moral
reason against humiliation does not advert to harm—merely to humilia-
tion per se. The second potential interpretation is to say that there is
always some reason or other not to humiliate others simply for pleasure
ðwhether or not that it is to humiliate for pleasure is itself the reasonÞ. But,
again, this is too fine-grained. There surely could be cases in which, ac-
cording to the harm view, there is no reason not to humiliate for pleasure,
namely, when it causes no harm. This possibility is not conceptually ruled
out, or even particularly hard to imagine ðperhaps, e.g., I could humili-
ate someone who is prudentially indifferent to humiliation, and whose
humiliation would generate substantial pleasure for many very poorly-off
individualsÞ, and hence this interpretation of the relevant claim qua dis-
tinguishing property would seem to rule out far too much—surely the
harm view should at least pass the gate when it comes to first-order moral
inquiry, whether or not we ultimately accept it.
The final interpretation: to insist that it is pro tanto wrong to hu-
miliate others simply for pleasure is to insist that typically there is a rea-
30. Shafer-Landau and Cuneo, “The Moral Fixed Points,” 405. Thanks to an anon-
ymous reviewer for suggesting I discuss views similar to those presented here.
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son, whatever that reason is, not to humiliate others simply for pleasure.
Assume for the moment that this claim could be established prior to
substantive inquiry—indeed, I’m inclined to think this is quite plausible.
But this renders the proposed “moral fixed point” far too coarse-grained
to distinguish the moral domain. Even prudence typically issues a rea-
son to refuse to humiliate others for pleasure—surely doing so is typically
not in our prudential best interests! Plausibly, etiquette, honor norms,
and a host of others will also typically insist that we not humiliate others
just for pleasure.
Of course, it will be pointed out immediately that each individual
“fixed point” needn’t be meant as a necessary and sufficient Project-
satisfying distinguisher. Rather, or so the suggestion goes, the distinc-
tiveness of morality could or should be given by the list as a whole ðwhich,
admittedly, is abbreviated hereÞ. But this is not enough to solve the prob-
lem. For the moral fixed points as a group to serve as the content-based
distinguisher, itmust be that no element is too fine-grained to be plausibly
prior to substantive inquiry, that is, rules out something that ought to
be allowed in. But this requires us to interpret each element in a way
that leaves open the virtual guarantee that many potential domains will
accept it. Indeed, only one entry on the entirety of Shafer-Landau and
Cuneo’s list plausibly rules out even prudence as counting on the inter-
pretation under which the relevant claims are acceptable gatekeepers,
that is, “the interests of others are sometimes morally weightier than
our own.” But virtually any other domain ðetiquette, for instanceÞwill hold
that sometimes the interests of others are weightier, according to that
domain, than our own interests.31 And hence if we are to interpret these
fixed points in a way that allows them to function as gatekeepers—as very
coarse-grained—it’s difficult to see how they could be genuinely distinc-
tive even as a collection.
In sum, morality clearly has a distinctive content. So much is trivial.
But we should reject the claim that a content-based account of morality’s
distinctiveness could satisfy The Project. This is not to say that there
could be no a priori truths of morality—perhaps there are. But because
distinguishing properties must be sufficiently fine-grained, it is implau-
sible to say that any content-based property that successfully distinguishes
morality frommyriad other domains could be prior to first-order inquiry.
And while I admittedly lack proof that no possible p could pass the tests
of sufficient fine-grainedness and sufficient coarse-grainedness ðperhaps,
e.g., the list of fixed points could be revised just so to be plausible gate-
keepers and also exclusive to moralityÞ I think we are licensed to con-
clude that there is very strong reason to believe that morality’s distinctive
31. Shafer-Landau and Cuneo, “The Moral Fixed Points,” 405.
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content is not prior to substantive moral inquiry, but rather awaits the
very inquiry The Project is meant to constrain.
III. GROUND
Plausibly, content-based moral properties cannot satisfy The Project. Sec-
ond proposal: one might distinguish morality by reference to its dis-
tinctive ground or source. ðI use these terms interchangeably here.Þ This
is Southwood’s approach:
I suggest that ½the difference between moral judgments and con-
ventional normative judgments is a matter of whether what I shall
call social practices are part of what is grounding the judgments. . . .
Moral judgments are normative judgments thatmay not be grounded,
even in part, in presumed social practices. Certain grounds are in-
compatible with being a moral judgment; and the existence of a
presumed social practice is a case in point. Where an individual
judges that soldiers must not rape women in war, if this is a genuine
moral judgment, it may not be the case that, in that individual’s
mind, a social practice of not raping women in war constitutes any
non-derivative aspect of the justification for the requirement that
soldiers not rape women in war. In this sense moral judgments are
essentially practice-independent.32
What is a “ground,” you ask? For Southwood, it is the justification or ex-
planation of a particular moral reason or requirement. Chris Heathwood
helpfully puts the notion of a ground or source like this: “Assuming some
moral claims are true, what makes them true? . . . In virtue of what are they
true? This grounding relation is an explanatory relation in that when one
fact is grounded in another, or made true by it, the latter explains the
former.”33 Though there is obviously significant metaethical disagreement
concerning the source/ground of moral norms,34 or even whether moral
norms have a source at all,35 it may be that whatever morality’s source is,
it is distinct from, for example, etiquette, the law, and various other do-
32. Southwood, “The Moral/Conventional Distinction,” 774, 780–81.
33. Chris Heathwood, “Could Morality Have a Source?,” Journal of Ethics and Social
Philosophy 6 ð2012Þ: 1–19, 4.
34. In particular, one notes the realist and antirealist dispute. This literature is volumi-
nous, but representative proposals include David Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of
Ethics ðCambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989Þ; Sharon Street, “Constructivism about
Reasons,” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol, 3, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau ðOxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2008Þ.
35. Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs ðCambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
2010Þ, chap. 1; Heathwood, “Could Morality Have a Source?”. For a critique of Dworkin
on this topic, see Russ Shafer-Landau, “The Possibility of Metaethics,” Boston Universit y
Law Review 90 ð2010Þ: 479–96.
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mains.36 In addition, like morality’s content, morality’s source would seem
clearly robust. After all, its source explains the particular content and con-
cerns morality has.
Many different accounts of morality’s ground have been offered:
moral judgments could be grounded by, for example, an optimal hypo-
thetical contract,37 or a second-personal standpoint in which one demands
actions of others,38 the nature of human rationality or autonomy,39 or the
“problem of sociality.”40 But however one understands the grounding or
source of morality and moral obligations, I doubt very much that moral-
ity’s ground or source has the capacity to distinguish morality prior to sub-
stantive inquiry. To see this, note that it is at least conceptually possible for
a particular grounding property p to radically underdetermine the con-
tent of the resulting normative domain. Of course, some underdetermi-
nation is to be expected: this underdetermination is the playing field of
substantive first-order moral inquiry. But I mean something different:
radical underdetermination is underdetermination that leaves the content
of the resulting domain so unspecified as to plausibly ground more than
one domain. Take an example. One could imagine that the problem of
sociality grounds not just a domain according to which the well-being
of others provides reasons for action, but also one according to which
the well-being of only one particular class provides reasons for action, and
according to which the members of other classes must be, say, crushed
with an iron boot. If both domains are answerable to the problem of
sociality, then themost plausible thing to say in this case is that the problem
of sociality does not ground a unique domain. Indeed, radical under-
determination of content appears precisely the problemwith Southwood’s
proposal. According to Southwood’s approach, the moral domain is not
grounded in social practices. But many different normative concerns are
not so grounded: a concern for beauty, a concern for my own welfare,
and so on. Southwood’s approach thus cannot distinguishmorality from,
for example, prudence and aesthetics ðto begin withÞ.41
36. Notice that the claim that morality has a distinct source in comparison to the law
is denied by Crisp. See Roger Crisp, Reasons and the Good ðOxford: Oxford University Press,
2006Þ, 9–12.
37. David Gauthier,Morals by Agreement ðOxford: Oxford University Press, 1984Þ; John
Rawls, A Theory of Justice ðCambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971Þ; Scanlon, What
We Owe to Each Other.
38. Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint .
39. Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity ðCambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1997Þ.
40. David Copp, “Toward a Pluralist and Teleological Theory of Normativity,” Philo-
sophical Issues 19 ð2009Þ: 21–37; Mackie,Morality, 111.
41. To be fair, Southwood admits this. See “The Moral/Conventional Distinction,” 781
n. 24. Southwood’s project is not to distinguish morality from all other domains, but only from
conventional domains. As such his proposal is perfectly compatible with everything I say here.
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Note that I’m not insisting that such radical underdetermination is
entailed by all of the grounding properties on offer. But for any grounding
property, it either radically underdetermines content, or it doesn’t. If it
does—as is the casewith Southwood’s proposal—then it cannot be the case
that the proposed grounding property is sufficient to distinguishmorality.
Alternatively, it could be that a grounding property or set of grounding
properties do not radically underdetermine. If this is correct, then noting
that morality maintains a unique ground surely does distinguish it. But to
distinguishmorality in this way cannot be prior to first-order inquiry. After
all, to know that this grounding property holds of morality uniquely, one
must know that this grounding property does not radically underdeter-
mine. In particular, one must know something about the content so-
grounded: onemust know that the so-grounded content plausibly captures
concerns that are distinctive of the moral point of view. If these concerns
are not distinctive of the moral point of view, then ðfor all we knowÞ the
relevant grounding property radically underdetermines ðgrounds, per-
haps, morality along with etiquette or some other domainÞ. What this
suggests is that to know that a particular grounding property does not
radically underdetermine—to know that the grounding property is genu-
inely distinctive—one must first ascertain the distinctive content of the
moral domain. Which, as I’ve already argued, is not prior to substantive
moral theorizing.
There is a second and, to my mind, even more significant argument
against the proposal to complete The Project with reference to morality’s
ground or source. Recall the tremendous controversy surrounding mo-
rality’s source. Let’s say that, motivated by this controversy, I take an ag-
nostic stand on morality’s source; I’m just not sure where it comes from
or what grounds it, and what distinguishes its source from the source of
other domains. But if the Grounds View is correct—and if the Grounds
View is intended to be the sort of gatekeeper that motivates The Project—I
should refrain from claiming with any confidence that at any given point
I’m taking up the moral point of view. After all, The Project is intended
to delineate the bounds of the moral point of view in a way that picks out
those judgments, concerns, reasons, and so forth that are and are not
morally relevant. But if I cannot identify the moral point of view by its
ground, and if morality’s ground is the relevant Project-satisfying distin-
guisher, then I must remain agnostic about whether or not I’m actually
conducting moral evaluation.42 But this is absurd. I can, with a relatively
42. An anonymous reviewer suggests that my argument here relies on the admittedly
dubious suggestion that I cannot assert that p without having knowledge of p’s truthmaker.
This is not my assertion. I ammerely noting here the result of combining the Grounds View
with The Project. Because morality’s distinguishing marks, according to those who advance
The Project, are prior to conducting moral inquiry it must be that to know that I’m actually
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high degree of confidence, take up the moral point of view to evaluate the
actions of self and others even with a very low degree of confidence in the
source or ground of particularlymoral obligations—all I need do is direct
my deliberation or evaluation given morality’s paradigmatic concerns,
however they are grounded. Andhence if this is correct, it seems wrong to
say that the gatekeeper of first-order moral inquiry should be morality’s
source or ground.
IV. REACTIVE ATTITUDES, MOTIVATION,
AND NORMATIVE IMPORTANCE
Now to theRAView, theMotivationView, and theNormativity View. These
accounts are importantly different, of course, but I’m going to treat them
in parallel here because, or so I argue, their fates are intertwined. The
most popular of these is the suggestion that moral obligations have a
unique connection to the reactive attitudes, such as blame and indigna-
tion.43 As discussed already, this is Gibbard’s view. Perhaps the most
influential statement of this view is given by Mill:
Wedonot call anythingwrong, unless wemean to imply that a person
ought to be punished in some way or other for doing it; if not by law,
by the opinion of his fellow-creatures; if not by opinion, by the re-
proaches of his own conscience. This seems the real turning point of
the distinction between morality and simple expediency. It is a part
of the notion of Duty in every one of its forms, that a person may
rightfully be compelled to fulfil it. Duty is a thing whichmay be exacted
from a person, as one exacts a debt. Unless we think that it may be
exacted from him, we do not call it his duty.44
Similar sentiments are expressed by T. L. S. Sprigge:
A moral code is a system of evaluations and prescriptions conformity
to which is encouraged in a society by public opinion. It differs from
a code of etiquette in that its supporters are concerned that public
43. The locus classicus of literature on the reactive attitudes is P. F. Strawson,
“Freedom and Resentment,” Proceedings of the British Academy 48 ð1962Þ: 1–25.
44. Mill, Utilitarianism , V.14.
conducting moral inquiry I know that the judgments I maintain have the relevant marks.
As Warnock suggests, until the distinguishing marks of morality are determined “moral
philosophers cannot really know what they are talking about, or at any rate, perhaps no less
importantly, cannot be sure whether or not they are all talking about the same thing” ðCon-
temporary Moral Philosophy, 52Þ. But combine this with the Grounds View, and one gets the
result that one cannot know one is conducting moral evaluation until one knows the explan-
atory property of those evaluations. And I agree: this result is entirely absurd. But its absur-
dity counts against the Grounds View as an attempt to satisfy The Project.
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opinion in all times and places shall back it up or regard it with
sympathy. Its supporter may allow that a different moral code would
be suitable for a different society, but he must hope that members
even of that society would sympathise with enforcement of his so-
ciety’s moral code in his society. He may make the same point by
regarding his and all other acceptable moral codes as special ap-
plications of a wider moral code which he would like to see enforced
by public opinion everywhere on everyone. Public opinion backs up
a moral code mainly by the threat that those who infringe it will be
less readily accepted members of any community where that public
opinion operates. To some extent it may also offer rewards, for it may
offer the man who goes beyond what is required to avoid condem-
nation the prospect of being universally honoured and loved.45
For each of these thinkers, failure to conform to moral demands entails
that those who so fail to conform are eligible for sanction or blame.46
This view has substantial prima facie plausibility. The difference, one
might say, between doing something imprudent and doing something
immoral is that it would seem perfectly appropriate to be blamed for
behaving immorally. To behave in an imprudent or ugly way may be a
significant or important failure, but it is typically not grounds for in-
dignation; unless, of course, one behaves immorally in the effort.
The Motivation View—that is, that morality maintains a distinctive
connection to the motivational states of rational agents—seems rela-
tively straightforward, but a further note should be made regarding the
Normativity View. What is a normative account of morality’s distinctive-
ness? Recall the narrow and broad senses of “morality.” The broad sense
of morality—an “all inclusive” guide to conduct—plausibly answers, in
any particular case, the general normative question: how should I live?
The narrow sense of morality answers ðconceptually, anywayÞ a different
question: how should I live morally speaking ðrather than according to
etiquette, prudence, and so forthÞ? To say that morality is distinctive in
virtue of its normative importance is to say that I ought to conform to my
moral obligations rather than, or at least to a greater extent than, other
sorts of obligations. It is to say that I ðtypicallyÞ ought to live in accor-
dance with moral obligations rather than obligations of other domains
ðwhen they conflictÞ; there is ðtypicallyÞ a greater balance of practical
reasons to conform to moral requirements than requirements of other
domains, and so on.
45. T. L. S. Sprigge, “The Definition of a Moral Judgment,” Philosophy 39 ð1964Þ: 301–
22, 321–22.
46. This is the conclusion reached also by Brad Hooker and Roger Crisp. See
Hooker, “The Definition of Morality”; and Crisp, Reasons and the Good, 9.
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I think the RA View, the Motivation View, and the Normativity View
ought to be rejected in one fell swoop. The argument I’m going to offer
here is not entirely straightforward, but here are the steps: morality’s
special normative authority, or so I shall argue, must be explained—but
this explanation must make reference to some other property that dis-
tinguishes morality from other domains. What could this other property
be? Well, it would have to be one of the other potential distinguishing
properties. But if morality’s distinctive normative authority is explained
via its distinctive source, ground, or content, whether morality does have
distinctive normative authority cannot be determined prior to substan-
tive inquiry and hence the Normativity View cannot complete The Proj-
ect. The obvious alternative explanation is a connection to blame or the
reactive attitudes ða lá Mill, Sprigge, etc.Þ, or a connection to the moti-
vations of rational agents. But these properties cannot explain the dis-
tinctive normative authority of morality, because any distinctive connec-
tion to motivation or the reactive attitudes maintained by morality must
itself be explained by the distinctive normative authority ofmorality. This
yields that not only is a reference to morality’s distinctive normative au-
thority unable to satisfy The Project ðbecause, even if true, it cannot be
established prior to substantive inquiryÞ, a reference to motivation or
the reactive attitudes can’t, either ðbecause they rely on a prior assump-
tion of morality’s distinctive authority, which, as it turns out, cannot be
established prior to substantive inquiryÞ.
Let’s start at the beginning. Morality’s distinctive normative author-
ity requires explanation. Here’s an argument for this.47 The following
two claims seem extremely plausible if the topic under discussion is mo-
rality’s narrow sense. Consider:
Nonmoral Authority ðNMAÞ: there are at least some nonmoral do-
mains, the requirements of which we have nonderivative reason to
conform to.
NMA is true. I certainly have practical reason to be polite rather than
rude, prudent rather than imprudent, to advance aesthetic value rather
than to hinder it, and so forth. Take now the following:
Morality Competes ðMCÞ: the requirements of morality can sometimes
compete for normative significance or importance in comparison to
the requirements of other domains.
MC claims that there are at least some cases in which the requirements of
morality will be opposed to, and will compete for normative significance
47. For more detail, see Dale Dorsey, “How Not to Argue against Consequentialism,”
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 ð2015Þ: 20–48.
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with, the requirements or evaluations of other standards. Sometimes,
for instance, I’m morally required to perform some particular action
despite the fact that it is ugly or imprudent; here, morality competes
with prudence or aesthetics for normative attention. Again, MC seems to
straightforwardly reflect our everyday moral/normative experience.
However, if we accept NMA and MC, those who would distinguish
morality and moral judgments by comparative normative significance
must hold that in such competition, morality wins, or at least will do so
typically or a comparatively large amount of the time ðdepending, of
course, on the level of normative significance being ascribed to moralityÞ.
But in light of NMA and MC, this fact deserves explanation. What reason
can be offered to believe that morality ðtypicallyÞ wins when it faces nor-
mative competition? Any such explanation must focus on some property
possessed by morality that is not possessed by other normative domains.
Otherwise it would not explain the crucial fact that requires explanation,
namely, why morality rather than some other domain maintains the req-
uisite level of importance.
Onemight disputemy claim that morality’s importance relies on the
assumption of a further distinguishing feature: morality’s importance
just is a conceptual truth of the nature of morality or moral requirement.48
But this proposal seems hard to square with the truth of MC and NMA.
After all, if we accept these theses, the comparative normative signifi-
cance of morality is not something that could be ascertained simply by
coming to a conceptual understanding of the nature of a moral require-
ment. Instead, the comparative normative significance of morality is a
fact ascertained only by a first-order inquiry into the nature of norma-
tivity, of practical rationality, and so forth. This inquiry is independent
of the per se nature of ðnarrowÞ moral demands. To put this another
way, once we accept that other domains are normative, and can some-
times compete with moral demands for normative attention, it would
appear that an inquiry into morality’s broad sense is required to deter-
mine whether or not moral requirements, in the narrow sense, are spe-
cially significant from the point of view of normativity ði.e., morality’s
broad senseÞ. Fully understanding the concept of morality’s narrow sense
can’t settle this question.
So to establish that morality maintains the relevant and distinct
form of normative authority, we must refer to a further distinguishing
feature. But if this is correct, the normative authority of morality cannot
distinguish morality by itself. It must be supplemented, at the very least
by the property that not only distinguishes morality but also provides the
explanation of morality’s normative authority. But that’s OK. There are
48. Cf. Michael Smith, The Moral Problem ðOxford: Blackwell, 1993Þ, chap. 3.
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plenty of other properties that could potentially be distinctive of mo-
rality: its content, ground, connection to reactive attitudes, and moti-
vation. Notice, however, that reference to morality’s distinctive content
is off the table if the Normativity View is to complete The Project. Be-
cause morality’s distinctive content is not prior to substantive inquiry
ðas argued beforeÞ, it follows that morality’s distinctive normative author-
ity—if explained by its distinctive content—isn’t either. If, on the other
hand, we explain the normative authority of morality by means of its
ground, to determine that its ground is distinctive—that is, not radically
underdeterminate—we must also distinguish it by its content ðas already
arguedÞ, and hence the normative authority of morality is, once again,
unable to satisfy The Project. Thus if morality’s ground or content ex-
plain its distinctive normative authority, morality’s distinctive normative
authority cannot satisfy The Project. Of course, there are two remaining
accounts: the RAView and the Motivation View. They could, in principle,
be distinctive of morality and also explain morality’s normative authority.
However, neither can work.
Begin with the RA View. The RA View can explain the distinctive
normative authority of morality only if morality’s distinctive connection
to the reactive attitudes is not itself explained by morality’s distinctive
authority. But, or so I argue, this is precisely the case. Any explanation of
morality’s distinctive connection to the reactive attitudes must make
reference to morality’s distinctive normative authority. I have argued at
length in favor of this conclusion elsewhere.49 But the central point is
this: we should not be the appropriate target of the reactive attitudes for
moral failures if those moral failures are not also normative failures.
Recall the general concept of normativity. To say that someone should,
in the normative sense, f, is to say that this person ought to f; that f-ing
is part of how this person ought to act or to live. To say that, normatively
speaking, one doesn’t have to f is to hold that one is perfectly justified
in not f-ing, that f-ing, even if it is an obligation of some particular do-
main, doesn’t hold of her as an obligation. Now imagine that there is
some moral requirement r that applies to a particular agent A, but that
does not form a normative obligation. Would we say that A should be
blamed for failing to r even thought she is perfectly justified in :r -ing?
Surely not!
Here’s another way to see this. Let’s imagine that the Normativity
View is false. Let’s say that etiquette, instead, maintains a distinctive
connection to practical reason in comparison to other domains. Would
we say that under these conditions immorality in particular should be
the special focus of blame, indignation? No—after all, in comparison to
etiquette, it is less important that people live in accordance with moral
49. See Dorsey, “How Not to Argue against Consequentialism,”
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obligations.50 And hence, or so it would appear, any explanation of
morality’s distinctive connection to the reactive attitudes must defend
the claim that it is true of morality, in a distinctive way, that moral failure
yields normative failure, or at least does so more typically than other
domains. And this just is to defend the special normative significance of
morality, that is, the Normativity View.
One might dispute my argument here on the following grounds.51
Doesn’t the claim that the reactive attitudes aren’t appropriate for failure
of non-normative moral requirements depend on one’s theory of reasons?
After all, there are surely some actions that are blame- or indignation-
worthy, and it seems an easy list to generate: betraying a friend, killing
an innocent person, and so on. But whether one violates a normative
requirement in the commission of such an act depends on first-order
facts of normativity, what theory of reasons is true, and so forth. Indeed,
or so it may be claimed, a classic internalist or subjectivist picture of
practical reasons may entail that one lacks overriding reason to refrain
from such actions.52 And hence I’m not licensed, without first deter-
mining the first-order facts about normativity, to claim that moral fail-
ure without rational failure isn’t the appropriate target of, for example,
blame.
I think this is an important objection. The crucial assumption is that
first-order facts about blameworthiness can be the product of an inde-
pendent line of inquiry, the results of which may or may not match up
with one’s theory of practical reasons. However, even if we accept this it
presents only a pyrrhic victory for the partisan of either the RA View or
the Normativity View. Insofar as we have independent access to the ac-
tions that are appropriate targets of such attitudes, whether moral fail-
ure is specially connected to the reactive attitudes surely depends on
one’s theory of morality. And hence even if we reject the necessary con-
50. This is not to say that normative failure is sufficient by itself to merit blame or
indignation. For instance, an anonymous reviewer suggests that if all other things are
equal, morality may not care about one’s purchase of the more effective, rather than less
effective, toothpaste. But perhaps normativity does. But in this case it would be odd to
blame you for selecting the less-effective toothpaste. But this says nothing about the view I
advocate here. All I require is that normative failure seems a necessary condition for
blame, not a sufficient condition; the only relevant point is that we should not be blamed
for failing to conform to moral obligations that are not normative for us, or fail to deter-
mine how we ought to live. This entails that to hold the RA View, one must already have
presupposed or established, at the very least, that no moral obligations fail to be nor-
mative—that morality is distinctively normatively authoritative.
51. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer.
52. Cf. BernardWilliams, “Internal and External Reasons,” inMoral Luck ðCambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1981Þ. Notice, however, that this claim is the subject of some
dispute in the recent literature on broadly subjectivist theories of reasons. See, in particular,
Mark Schroeder, Slaves of the Passions ðOxford: Oxford University Press, 2007Þ.
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dition I’m tempted to accept, this doesn’t vindicate the RA View ðand
doesn’t allow the normativity view to gain traction via the RA ViewÞ, at
least as a Project-satisfying distinguisher of morality. If we accept the
crucial assumption here, that is, if we have independent access to first-
order facts about the appropriateness of the reactive attitudes, the ex-
tent of the overlap between moral failure and such actions appears to be
a question that awaits substantive first-order moral investigation. I sup-
pose one might declare, in response to this, that the appropriateness
of blame and the reactive attitudes should be “pegged” to the results of a
particular domain. There are two ways one might do this: one might ei-
ther reject the existence of an independent inquiry into blameworthi-
ness, and so on, or one might insist that whatever domain these facts are
pegged to should be adjusted in light of a reflective equilibrium about
blame, and so forth. But however one draws this connection, if we’re
going to peg the reactive attitudes to the deliverances of a particular do-
main, it seems strange to say that we should peg them to the results of a
domain ðmoralityÞ the normativity of which is up for grabs, rather than
the domain according to which we ought to live. ðNotice that this would
of course allow us, if we accept independent access to blameworthy ac-
tions, to alter our theories of how to live in light of substantive considered
judgments of blameworthiness.Þ Of course, I don’t mean to argue that
morality fails to have a distinctive connection to the reactive attitudes. For
all I argue here, it certainly does. I only suggest that if in fact it main-
tains this special connection, that it does must be explained by its special
normative authority, and hence the RAView cannot, in turn, explain that
authority.
The very same arguments just used to show that the RA View can’t
explain morality’s normative importance seem to me to easily translate
into a demonstration that the Motivation View can’t either.53 Indeed, at
first glance, it seems even more straightforward to believe that the Mo-
tivation View is not independent of an assumption of morality’s distinc-
tive normative authority. Why, we may ask, does morality in particular
form this special connection to the motivational states of rational agents,
rather than etiquette? The answer, plausibly, refers to the fact that eti-
quette is less normatively significant than morality: morality, rather than
etiquette, is the domain that most closely models how we ought to live.
It would be distinctly odd to hold that morality bears a special connec-
53. This is no objection to moral motivational internalism per se. I merely mean to
indicate that an internal connection between a moral ðin its narrow senseÞ judgment and
motivation is wildly implausible if we’re not already presuming that morality has a special
normative status in comparison to other domains. If we judge that etiquette is no less
normatively significant thanmorality, it would appear extremely odd to say that nevertheless
morality displays a special motivational role.
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tion to the motivational states of rational agents but that, nevertheless,
morality has no special normative significance in comparison to other
standpoints.
The argument of this section has taken several steps. A recap. Point
one: morality’s normative authority must be explained by reference to a
further distinctive property. Point two: if explained by its distinctive
content or grounds, morality’s normative authority cannot satisfy The
Project. Point three: morality’s normative authority cannot be explained
by a special connection to reactive attitudes or motivation, because the
explanatory arrow goes in the other direction. Morality’s normative au-
thority explains any special connection to the reactive attitudes or the
motivations of rational agents moral obligations may have. But if that’s
right, then, point four: morality’s normative authority is best explained
either bymorality’s ground ormorality’s content, neither of which is prior
to substantive moral investigation, and hence the Normativity View fails
to satisfy The Project. But there’s more. Point five: becausemorality’s nor-
mative authority explains any connection moral obligations may have
to the reactive attitudes or to motivation, and because morality’s norma-
tive authority is not prior to substantive moral investigation, a purported
special connection to the reactive attitudes or the motivations of rational
agents is also not prior to substantive first-order inquiry. Thus neither
the Normativity View, RAView, nor Motivation View succeed in satisfying
The Project.
V. CONCLUSION: MORAL INQUIRY IN LIGHT OF
THE PROJECT’S DEMISE
At this point I conclude my argument against The Project. You’ll note that
it’s not rock solid. In principle, other potential distinguishing char-
acteristics could be offered as distinctive of morality, robust, and able to
play the essential “gatekeeping” role. But the failure of the accounts on
offer—which happen to be the most well-worn accounts of morality’s
distinctiveness—to satisfy The Project justifies a substantial skepticism
that The Project can be satisfied.
However, if The Project does not succeed, this has important im-
plications for the conduct of first-order moral inquiry. To see this, one
might consider a potential objection to my rejection of The Project.
Recall that The Project is motivated by an attempt to account for the
possibility of sensible moral inquiry. According to Warnock and Hooker,
we cannot conduct moral inquiry unless and until we know which judg-
ments have moral content. No first-order moral theorizing is possible, in
other words, until we have set up a gatekeeper sufficient to distinguish
moral judgments ðor moral requirements, reasons, and so forthÞ from
judgments of etiquette, prudence, and so on. But if The Project fails, no
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such gatekeeper can be found. But if this is right, first-order inquiry into
the structure and content of morality is doomed. This is good enough for
a reductio if anything is.
But this argument relies on a dubious assumption. To conduct
moral inquiry, we do not require the sort of gatekeeper that Hooker
and Warnock, and many others, insist upon. Instead, we should say that
whether a considered judgment has moral content or not should be
determined by its capacity to survive whatever proper epistemic proce-
dure is appropriate for first-order moral inquiry—such as reflective equi-
librium with our substantive considered judgments, including our con-
sidered judgments concerning the distinctiveness of the moral domain.
If, for instance, I judge that I am morally required to treat the Queen of
England with traditional deference, whether or not this judgment has
moral content should be determined by whether this judgment is or is
not coherent with the remainder of our purportedly moral judgments
in reflective equilibrium ðif, in fact, this epistemological method is ap-
propriateÞ. If it is, thenmy judgment hasmoral content. If it is not ðwhich
I suspectÞ, then it does not. None of this renders the content of moral
inquiry any less moral. It merely entails that part of what we determine in
conducting moral inquiry is just what sort of X ðreason, requirement,
judgment, and so onÞ counts as a genuinely moral X, after all.
These implications for moral inquiry seem to imply two additional
lessons. First, thoughmy argument against The Project does not, nor was
it designed to, offer any particular account of morality’s distinctiveness,
if The Project fails, this is an important result for future inquiry into
morality’s distinguishing characteristics. Because morality’s distinctive-
ness can be ascertained only after a substantive inquiry into the moral
domain, it would seem that a natural ðthough perhaps not the onlyÞ
account of morality’s distinctiveness just refers to whatever general the-
ory systematizes the reasons, requirements, and concerns of morality.
If, for instance, first-order inquiry yields the result that utilitarianism is
the true theory of moral standards, then morality is distinguished, or
so it seems to me, by the fact that it is the domain of which utilitarianism
is true.
Second, justified skepticism of The Project is extraordinarily sig-
nificant for the conduct of moral inquiry. As I noted in Section I, many
use The Project to reject or limit the consideration of potential accounts
of moral demands. But if there is no gatekeeping distinguishing prop-
erty, then no first-order moral theories, judgments, or reasons should be
ruled out simply on the basis of their incompatibility with a purported
distinguishing characteristic of morality. One should not judge a moral
theory because, for example, this theory is not sufficiently attuned to the
reactive attitudes, or because this theory admits of self-regarding duties,
or because this theory is not sufficiently welfarist, or because this theory
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is incompatible with morality’s normative importance, or any other. This
is because, though such features of morality can be important consid-
ered judgments that help to shape substantive moral inquiry, they can-
not and should not constrain it ðthough they can certainly be participantsÞ.
Whether, for instance, morality maintains its privileged connection to the
reactive attitudes, or whether morality is other-regarding or impartial in
concern, and so on, must await determination of whether the true moral
theory can accommodate these claims.
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